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BEAGLE V. VASOLD

[L. A. No. 28909.

In Bank.

[65 C.2d

Aug. 31,1966.]

CARL BEAGJ.lE,Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ELIZABETH
V ASOLD et al., Defendants and Respondents.
[1] Damages-Measure-Physical and Mental Su1fering.-Translating pain and anguish into dollars can be only an arbitrary
allowance, not a process of measurement.
[2] Id.-Instructions-Physical Suffering.-In instructing on damages for pain and anguish, a judge can give the jury no
standard to go by; he can only tell the jury to allow such
amount as in their discretion they may consider reasonable.
[3] Id.-Measure-Physical and Mental Suffering.-In attempting
to value· suffering in terms of money, the chief reliance for
reaching reasonable results must be the restraint and common
sense of the jury.
[4] Id. - Measure - Physical and Mental Suffering: TrialArgument of Oounsel- Scope - Reading Pleadings. - In an
action .to recover damages for personal injury involving pain
and suffering, an attorney may read the complaint, including
the prayer, to the jury.
[fi1 Id.-Instructions.-In an action to recover damages, the trial
court may instruct the jury that plaintiff ~laims a certain
amount as damages in his complaint and that no more than
this sum may be awarded.
.
[6] Id.-Measure-Physical and Mental Suffering: Trial-Argument of Oounsel-Scope.-In an action to recover damages for
personal injuries involving pain and suffering, plaintiff's
counsel may argue for a per diem allowance for such suffering.
[7] Id.-Evidence: Trial-Argument of Oounsel.-Although argument of counsel does not constitute evidence of damage, it does
not follow that counsel's suggestion of a sum for damages can
have no foundation in the evidence.
[8] Trial-Argument of Oounsel-Scope.-During argument, an
attorney is permitted to discuss all reasonable inferences from
the evidence.

McK. Dig. References: [1, 3] Damages, § 61; [2, 18, 19] Damages, § 205; [4] Damages, § 61; Trial, § 52; [5] Damages, § 198;
[6, 20-22, 24, 25] Damages, § 61; Trial, § 50 (1); [7] Damages,
§188; Trial, §33(1); [8,23] Trial, 50(1); [9] Damages, §189;
Trial, § 50(1); [10] Damages, § 18; Trial, § 50(1); [11] Damages,
§ 205; Trial, § 50(1); [12] Damages, § 197; [13] Damages, §§ 86,
87,213; [14] Damages, §94; [15] Damages, §213; Trial, §50(1);
[16] Damages, §§ 86, 87; [17] Damages, § 85; Trial, § 50(1); [26]
Damages, § 109; [27] Damages, § 87.
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[9] Damages-Evidence-Personal Injury Cases: Trial-Argument
of Counsel-Scope.-An attorney who suggests to the jury that
his client's damages for pain and suffering be calculated on a
per diem basis is not presenting evidence but is merely drawing
. an inference from the evidence given at the trial.
[10] ld.-Oompensatory Damages-Speculative Damages: TrialArgument of Counsel-Scope.-The trial court has the power
and duty to contain argument within legitimate bounds and
may preyent an attorney from drawing inferences unwarranted by the evidence; and counsel should not be permitted to
argue future damages for pain and suffering on a per diem
basis where the evidence would not justify an inference that
plaintiff will suffer pain in the future.
[11] ld.-Instructions-Physical Suffering: Trial-Argument of
Counsel-Scope.-Where counsel asserts in argument that
compensation for pain and suffering should be measured on a
per diem basis, it should not be concluded as a matter of
law that the jury will ignore the court's instruction to award a
reasonable amount for plaintiff's pain and suffering and that
the jury will inevitably choose an indefensible course of'
slavishly following counsel's suggestions on damages.
[12] ld.-Province of Court and Jury.-In an action to recover
damages for personal injury involving pain and suffering, the
jury is the ultimate judge of the inferences to be drawn from
the evidence presented, and the jury is so instructed by the
court.
[13] Id.-Excessive Damages-Power of 'l'rial Court: Power of
Appellate Courts: Verdict.-Both the trial and appellate courts
have the power and duty to reduce verdicts for unreasonably
large damages, and even if it can be established that larger
verdicts result on occasions when counsel employ an argument
for a per diem allowance for pain and suffering, it does not
necessarily follow that these awards are excessive under the
circumstances of the particular cases.
[14] Id.-Test of Excessive Verdict.-A verdict for damages is not
excessive as a matter of law where the amount awarded is
identical to the sum suggested by plaintiff's counsel.
[16] Id. - Verdict: Trial - Argument of Oounsel - Scope.Whatever manner of calculation is proposed by counselor
employed by the jury to determine damages for pain and
suffering, the verdict must meet the test of reasonableness. An
argument for a per diem allowance for pain and suffering is
only a suggestion as to one method of reaching the goal of
reasonableness, not a substitute for it.
[11] See Cal.Jur.2d, Damages, § 151; Am.Jur.2d, Damages, § 105;
CalJur.2d, Trial, § 94; Am.Jur., Trial (1st ed § 485).
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[16] Id.-Excessive Damages-Power of Trial Court: Power of
Appellate Court.-Where a jury's award for pain and suffering
does not meet the test of reasonableness, the trial court has
the duty to reduce it, and the appellate court has the authority
to review the result.
[17] Id. - Excessive Damages: Trial- Argument of CounselScope.-In· an action to recover damages, plaintiff's counsel
assumes the risk of overpersuasion, and where he overstates
his claim there is nothing to prevent defense counsel from
pointing out this strategem or to argue that the amount
suggested is excessive and emphasize the jury's duty to award
only a reasonable sum as compensation.
[18] Id.-Instruction-Physical Suffering.-A trial court can and
should instruct the jury that argument of counsel as to the
amount of damages claimed by plaintiff is not evidence and·
that the jury's duty is only to award such damages as will
,. reasonably compensate plaintiff for his pain and suffering.
[19] Id.-Instructions-Physical Su1fering.-When deemed appropriate, the trial court may advise the jury it is not bound by
any particular method of calculating damages for pain and
suffering.
[20] Id. - Measure - Physical and Mental Suffering: TrialArgument of Counsel - Scope. - In an action to recover
damages for personal injury involving pain and suffering,
argumellt for a per diem allowance for pain and suffering
provides a more explicit comprehension and humanization o~
plaintiff's predicament to lay jurors, and such argument is an;
effective tool in the hands of plaintiff's attorney. However, this
alone is not sufficient reason to condemn such argument.
.
[21] Id. - Measure - Physical and Mental Suffering: TrialArgument of Counsel-Scope.-Argument for a per diem
allowance for pain and suffering is not beneficial exclusively to
plaintiffs seeking damages; such argument is equally available
to and of equal utility to defense counsel who may employ the
technique to divide plaintiff's total demand into time segments
to illustrate how exaggerated or ludicrous the claim may be.
[22] Id. - Measure - Physical and Mental Suffering: TrialArgument of Counsel-Scope.-Denial of argument for a per
diem allowance for pain and suffering deprives counsel of the
full fruits of effective advocacy on the issue of damages, which
is frequently the crucial confl.ict in the trial of a personal
injury action.
[23] Trial-Argument of Counsel-Scope.-Only the most persuasive reasons justify handcuffing attorneys in the exercise of
their advocacy within the bounds of propriety.
[16] See Cal.Jur.2d, Damages, § 229; Am.Jur.2d, DamageS,
§ 338.
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[24] Damages-Measure-Physical and Mental Suffering: TrialArgument of Counsel-Scope.-Though plaintiff's counsel may
properly suggest to a jury that plaintiff's paiu and suffering be
measured on a per diem basis, this rule does not imply
approval of the so-called "golden rule" argument, by which
counsel asks the jury to place themselves in plaintiff's shoes
and to award such damages as they would charge to undergo
equivalent pain and suffering.
[26] ld. - Measure - Physical and Mental Suffering: TrialArgument of Oounsel-Scope.-Existing rules for the trial
court's control over the scope of counsel's argument sufficiently
protect the integrity of the jury's decision-making role as to
the damages allowable for pain and suffering, and there is no
justification for holding that an argument for a per diem
allowance for pain and suffering is governed by special
standards not applicable to other types of argument.
[26] ld.-lnadequate Damages.-It was reasonably probable that a
result more favorable to plaintiff would have been reached had
the trial court permitted counsel to argue for a per diem
allowance for pain and suffering where the jury verdict allowed
only $342 more than the medical expenses incurred prior to
trial though plaintiff, a carpenter, 39 years old at the time of
the accident, suffered cuts to his head and hands, a chipped
front tooth, impaired vision, severe back pains radiating down
his thighs to the knees, and though, as a result of the accident,
he was required to wear glasses, a back brace, and had been
unable to work in his trade as a carpenter.
[27] ld.-Inadequate Damages-Oonsideration by Appellate Oourt.
.
-In a personal injury case, where the evidence of liability is
in sharp and substantial conflict and the damages awarded are
so grossly inadequate as to indicate a compromise on the issues
of liability and damages, the case should be remanded for
retrial of both issues.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San
Diego County. Bonsall Noon, Judge. Reversed.
Action for damages for personal injuries sustained in an
automobile accident. Judgment for plaintiff awarding allegedly
inadequate damages reversed.
Rubin, Seltzer & Solomon and Richard I. Singer for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Edward I. Pollock, Theodore A. Horn, Richard L. Oliver,
Robert G. Beloud; Robert E. Cartwright, Neil D. Heily ana
Edward L. Lascher as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and
Appellant.
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Higgs, Fletcher & Mack, Edward M. Wright and Dan E.
Hedin for Defendants and Respondents.
Parker, Stanbury, }tIcGee, Peckham & Garrett, Crider,
Tilson & Ruppe, Betts & Loomis, Gilbert, Thompson & Kelly
and Jean Wunderlich as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants
and Respondents.

.•~

MOSK. J.-Plaintiff brought an action against defendants
for personal injuries suffered by him as the result of an
automobile accident. The jury returned a verdict in his favor
in the sum of $1,719.48, and he appeals from the judgment
entered thereon, contending that the damages awarded are
inadequate as a matter of law. The only issue raised on this
appeal by any of the parties, including amici curiae, is
whether the trial court erred in prohibiting plaintiff's counsel
from stating in argument to the jury the amount of general
damages claimed by plaintiff, either in terms of a total sum or
of a sum for a time segment. We conclude it was error to
restrict counsel's arguments in that regard.
Plaintiff's injuries resulted from an accident in which a car
driven by Kenneth Vasold went over an embankment while
rounding a curve in the road. Vasold died as a result of his
injuries. Plaintiff and two o~her occupants of the car, Beverly
Adams, and Vasold's wife, i Elizabeth, were injured. l In the
complaint, plaintiff prayed for $61,025.18 in general damages,
as well as compensation for medical expenses, loss of earnings,
and costs of suit.
The trial court informed plaintiff's attorney in chambers
that he would not be permitted to mention to the jury "the
value of his action in dollars" in a lump sum or as to "any
per diem damages such as so many dollars per day, or so many
dollars per month" because" [S]uch is not evidence."2 In
lThe defendants in this action are Elizabeth Vasold and the administrator of Vasold's estate.
2The following colloquy occurred between plaintiff's attorney and
the court during the opening statement:
"MR. SINGER: I want to talk just very briefly with you about the
amount of money in controversy in this case. Before I do, I remember
your Honor's admonition in chambers j that did not apply 'to opening
statements, is that correct, your Honorf
"THE COURT: Yes. At all times.
"MR. SINGER: At all times, your Honor'
I I THE COURT: Yes. Except as to your special.
I I MR. SINGER: Oh, I see.
I I THE COURT: But as to the general.
I I 14K. SINGER: All right. Thank you, your Honor."
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accordance with this request, counsel confined his arguments
on the question of damages to the amount of past and anticipated medical expenses and loss of earnings, a description of
plaintiff's injuries, and general statements to the effect that
plaintiff was entitled to recover for past and future pain and
suffering resulting from the accident. s Plaintiff's medical
expenses up to the time of trial were $1,377.48, and his total
claim for special damages was $21,502.48. Thus the jury's
verdict of $1,719.48 amounts to $342 more than the medical
expenses incurred prior to trial. His motion for a new trial on
the ground of inadequacy of the damages was denied by the
trial court.
On this appeal, it is contended that the trial court's action
in restricting the argument of counsel on the issue of general
damages was erroneous and that the error was prejudicial.
Prior to the summation. the court and counsel discussed the scope
of permissible argument in chambers as follows:
"THE COURT: My suggestion to counsel is that during tlleir summation that no calculations be made, either verbally or on the blackboard,
of any per diem damages such as so many dollars per day; or so many
dollars per month. Further, that the opinion of counsel not be given
as to the value of his ac~ion in dollars. Such is not evidence.
"M&. SINGER: If I understand the Court's instructions on this point,
I am then permitted to talk in specific figures about the special damages,
the medical damages'
"THE COURT: No question about that.
"MR. SINGER: And the loss of wages-but not about the estimated
future loss of wages-in terms of specific :figures. I may do so,
"THE CoURT: Yes. That is special. This only applies to general
damages.
"MR. SINGER: I see. Then I may only not speak in t.erms of :figures
as to the amount to be awarded to my clients, if there is an award, for
permanent disability and for pain and suffering; is that generally correct!
, 'THE COURT: This is my request: That counsel not tell the jury that
in his opinion the general damages are worth $50,000 or $40.000, or $2;).
Of course, as to your special. naturally those are :fixed amounts. Tht'y
have been test.ified to and they are in the evidence; but there is nothing
in the evidence whatsoever of any amount of general damages. Do you
understand each onet
"MR. SINGER: Yes."
aWith regard to the question of general damages, plaintiff's attorney
stated in closing argument: "Mr. Beagle's vision, of course. was affected
by the accident. His life expectancy is 30.5 years (writing). And he
is entitled to an award based on the permanent disability that he will
incur as the result of this accident. And, of course, an award for the
pain and sutTering which be incurred as t.he result of t.his accident and
will incur in the future. You will recall Mr. Beagle was in the hospital
13 days. He, of course, was injured in the accident with severe head
lacerations, and has worn a corset-type brace for the last two years as
the result of the accident.. You are entitled to take these things into
consideration as far as pain and ButTering, and the pain and sutTering
that he will necessarily incur in the future."
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One of the most difficult tasks imposed upon a jury in decid.
ing a case involving personal injuries is to determine the
amount of money the plaintiff is to be awarded as compensation for pain and suffering. No method is available to the jury
by which it can objectively evaluate such damages, and' no
witness may express his subjective opinion on the matter. (See
7 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 944, pp. 55-56.) In a'·
very real sense, the jury is asked to evaluate in terms of
money a detriment for which monetary compensation cannot
be ascertained with any demonstrable accuracy. [1, 2] As
one writer on the subject has said, "Translating pain and
anguish into dollars can, at best, be only an arbitrary allowance, and not a process of measurement, and consequently the
judge can, in his instructions, give the jury no standard to go
by; he can only tell them to allow such amount as in their
discretion they may consider reasonable. . .. [3] The chief
reliance for'reaching reasonable results in attempting to value
suffering in terms of money must be the restraint and common
sense of the jury. . . . " (McCormick on Damages, § 88, pp.
318-319.)
Before turning to the question of the propriety of the socalled "per diem" argument," it is significant to note that,
while no case has been found specifically holding an attorney
may inform the jury as to the total amount of the general
damages sought by the plaintiff, there is a clear implication
that such a statement may be made by an attorney, and
defendants here do not seriously challenge plaintiff's assertion
that the trial court erred in limiting counsel's argument in
this regard.
It has long been a courtroom practice of attorneys in this
state to tell the jury the total amount of damages the plaintiff
seeks, and no questioning of the technique has come to our
attention. (See dissenting opinion of Carter, J., in Sanguinetti
v. Moore Dry Dock Co. (1951) 36 Ca1.2d 812, 823, 842 [228
P.2d 557] ; Ritzman v. MiUs (1929) 102 Cal.App. 464, 472
[283 P. 88].) [4] Moreover, an attorney may and frequently
does read the complaint, including the prayer, to the jury.
(Knight v. Russ (1888) 77 Cal. 410, 414-415 [19 P. 698] ; see
Ritzman v Mills, supra, at p. 472.) [5] Finally, the trial
court may instruct the jury that the plaintiff claims a certain
"This term will be used in the opinion to refer to argument by
counsel which suggests the segmentation of the damages to be allowed
for pain and suffering into a stated amount of money representing a certain period of time, such as $5 for each day, etc.
.
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amount as damages in his complaint and that no morc than
this sum may be awarded. (Sanguinetti v. Moore Dry Dock
Co., supra, at p. 816; Lahti v. McMenamin (1928) 204 Cal.
415, 421 [268 P. 644] ; McNulty v. Southern Pac. Co. (1950)
96 Cal.App.2d 841,852-853 [216 P.2d 534].) In the Lahti case
it was said that such an instruction" is usually given in negligence cases, and it is difficult to understand how a jury in
such cases can be properly instructed by the court" without a
direction of this type. (204 Cal. at p. 421; see also BAJI Nos.
173, 173-A, 173-B, 173-C.) On the other hand, Pennsylvania
and New Jersey prohibit disclosure of this information to the
jury. See Reese v. Hershey (1894) 163 Pa. 253 [29 A. 907, 43
Am.St.Rep. 795];' Porter v. Zeuger Milk Co. (1939) 138
Pa.Super.48 [7 A.2d 77] ; Botta v. Brunner (1958) 26 N.J. 82
[138 A.2d 713, 725].)
The question whether an attorney may argue to the jury
that his client's damages for pain and suffering may be
measured in terms of a stated number of dollars for specific
periods of time presents a more difficult problem. Few issues
in the area of tort law have evoked more controversy in the
last decade. While no California case has decided the matter
(but see dissenting opinion in Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit
Lines (1961) 56 Cal.2d 498, 509 [15 Cal.Rptr. 161, 364 P.2d
337]), the controversy has been resolved in most of our sister
states and in some federal jurisdictions.
[6] Twenty-one jurisdictions which have passed on the
issue permit an attorney to make the "per diem" argument.
(Baron Tube Co. v. Transport Ins. Co. (5th Cir. 1966) 365
F.2d 858; Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Kines (1963) 276
Ala. 253 [160 So.2d 869] ; Vanlandingham v. Gartman (1963)
236 Ark. 504 [367 S.W.2d 111] ; Newbury v. Vogel (1963) 151
Colo. 520 [379 P.2d 811]; Evening Btar Newspaper Co. v.
Gray (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1962) 179 A.2d 377; Ratner v .
.Arrington (Fla.App. 1959) 111 So.2d 82; Southern Indiana
Gas &7 Elec. Co. v. Bone (1962) 135 Ind.App. 531 [180 N.E.2d
375], affd. 244 Ind. 672 [195 N.E.2d 488] ; Corkery v. Greenberg (1962) 253 Iowa 846 [114 N.W.2d 327] ; Louisville &7
Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mattingly (Ky.App. 1960) 339 S.W.2d
155; Little v. Hughes (La.App. 1961) 136 So.2d 448; Eastern
Shore Public Service Co. v. Corbett (1962) 227 Md. 411 [177
A.2d 701], affd. 180 A.2d 681; Yates v. Wenk (1961) 363 Mich.
311 [109 N.W.2d 828] ; Flaherty v. Minneapolis &7 St. Louis
By. Co. (1958) 251 Minn. 345 [87 N.W.2d 633] ; Arnold v.
Ellis (1957) 231 Miss. 757 [97 So.2d 744]; Wyant v. Dunn
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(1962) 140 Mont. 181 [368 P.2d 917]; Johnson v. Brown
(1959) 75 Nev. 437 [345 P.2d 754] ; Grossnickle v. Village of
Germantown (1965) 3 Ohio St.2d 96 [209 N.E.2d 442];
Edwards v. Lawton (1964) 244 S.C. 276 [136 S.E.2d 708] ;
Hernandez v. Baucum (Tex.Civ.App. 1961) 344 S.W.2d 498;
Olsen v. Preferred Risk Mutual Ins. Co. (1960) 11 Utah 2d
23 [354 P.2d 575] ; Jones v. Hogan (1960) 56 Wn.2d 23 [351
P.2d 153] ; see also Imperial Oil, Ltd. v. Drlik (6th Cir. 1956)
234 F.2d 4.) Of these jurisdictions, Florida, Montana, Nevada,
Utah and Washington hold that the matter rests in the sound
discretion of the trial judge.6
In 11 jurisdictions the argument is not permitted. (Henne v.
Balick (1958) 51 Del. 369 [146 A.2d 394] ; Franco v. Fujimoto
(1964) 47 Hawaii 408 [390 P.2d 740]; Caley v. Manicke
(1962) 24 Ill.2d 390 [182 N.E.2d 206]; Caylor V. Atchison,
Topeka &- Santa Fe Ry. Co. (1962) 190 Kan. 261 [374 P.2d
53] ; Faught v. Washam (Mo. 1959) 329 S.W.2d 588; Duguay
v. Gelinas (1962) 104 N.H. 182 [182 A.2d 451]; Botta v.
Brunner (1958) supra, 138 A.2d 713; Certified T.V. &- Appliance Co. v. Harrington (1959) 201 Va. 109 [109 S.E.2d 126] ;
Crum v. Ward (1961) 146 W.Va. 421 [122 S.E.2d 18] ; Afldl
v. Milwaukee &- Suburban Transport Corp. (1960) 11 Wis.2d
604 [106 N.W.2d 274] ; Henman v. Klinger (Wyo. 1966) 409
P.2d 631; see also Paley v. Brust (1964) 21 App.Div.2d 758
[250 N.Y.S.2d 356] ; King v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.
(N.D. 1961) 107 N.W.2d 509.)
The conflict has also been thoroughly debated in the law
reviews. An examination of a large number of articles on the
subject indicates that a substantial majority of the authors are
5Defendants assert that only one of the eases cited above for the
majority view (Newbury v. Vogel (1963) supra, 379 P.2d 811) involved --a situation where, as here, the trial court refused to allow the "per
diem" argument and the appellate court held the refusal erroneous, and
that in the remainder of the eases cited for the majority view the trial
court permitted "per diem" argument and the appellate court upheld
the lower court's determination that such argument was proper. It
follows, therefore, argue defendants, that the majority rule is not that
the "per diem" argument may be made by an attorney as a matter of
right but only that the issue is to be determined in the sound discretion
of the trial court. This is an incorrect analysis. Some of the cases, as
indicated above, expressly provide that the question whether to permit
, 'per diem" argument is committed to the discretion of the trial court.
Those which do not so state hold generally that for the reasons set forth
in the subsequent portions of this opinion, the "per diem" argument is
a proper one. Presumably. a refusal by the trial court to permit the
, 'per diem" type of argument would result in a reversal of the judgment in these jurisdictions it the issue were raised in the proper conUgt J
and prejudice resulted from the refusal.
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of the view that it is desirable to permit "per diem"
argument. G (See generally favoring "per diem" argument:
Phillips, Botta in Focus (1962) Trial Law. Guide 69; Note
(1958) 12 Rutgers L.Rev. 522; Note (1962) 60 Mich.L.Rev.
612; Note (1959) 43 Minn.L.Rev. 832; Note (1963) 17
Ark.L.Rev. 94; Note (1961) 41 B.U.L.Rev. 432; Note (1961)
38 Ohi.-Kent L.Rev. 62; Note (1959) 28 U.Cine.L.Rev. 138;
Note (1962) 11 Clev.-Mar.L.Rev. 495; Note (1959) 36 Dicta
373; Note (1962) Duke L.J. 344; Note (1962) 13 Hastings
L.J. 502; Note (1962) 11 Kan.L.Rev. 170; Note (1961) 10
Kan.L.Rev. 93; Note (1960) 38 N.C.L.Rev. 289; Note (1963)
39 N.D.L.Rev. 209; Note (1960) 33 So.Cal.L.Rev. 214; Note
(1962) 14 S. C.L. Q. 442; generally dJisfavoring "per diem"
argument: Note (1963) 12 De Paul L.Rev. 317; Note (1961)
49 Ky.L.J. 592; Note (1962) La.L.Rev. 461; Note (1962) 23
Ohio St. L.J. 573; Note (1963) 16 Okla.L.Rev. 468; Note
(1962) Vand.L.Rev. 1303; Note (1958) 4 ViII.L.Rev. 137;
Note (1962) 64 W.Va.L.Rev.237; Note (1959).61 W.Va.
L.Rev. 302.)
We believe the reasons hereinafter discussed persuasively
require California to align itself with the majority of jurisdictions on this issue.
The opening guns in the battle to prohibit an attorney from
arguing damages on a "per diem" basis were sounded in
Botta v. Brunner (1958) supra, 138 A.2d 713, and every decision since Botta holding such argument to be improper has
followed, at least in part, the reasoning employed in that case.
In Botta the Supreme Court of New Jersey upheld the trial
court's refusal to permit plaintiff's attorney to suggest that
his client's damages for pain and suffering be measured by a
stated number of dollars for each day, essentially on the
rationale that such statements of counsel are not evidence and
have no foundation in the evidence, but in the minds of jurors
they substitute "unproven, speculative and fanciful standards
of evaluation for evidence."
The court stated: "In the final analysis, we hold the view
that suggestions of the sort we are asked to approve here
constitute an unwarranted intrusion into the domain of the
jury. . . . 'Jurors know the nature of pain, embarrassment
and inconvenience, and they also know the nature of money.
GNot included in this compilation are articles from journals published
by organizations such as the Defense Research Institute, Inc., and the
American Trial Lawyers Association, formerly known as the National
. Auoeiation of Claimants Compensation Attorneys.
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Their problem of equating the two to afford reasonable and
just compensation calls for a high order of human judgment,
and the law has provided no better yardstick for their guidance than their enlightened conscience. Their problem is not
one of mathematical calculation but involves an exercise of
their sound judgment of what is fair and right.' " (138 A.2d
at p. 725.)
With commendable forthrightness Botta overruled a long
line of New Jersey cases which had held it proper for an
attorney to advise the jury of the total amount of damages
sought by the plaintiff or to suggest a total amount as reasonable compensation, on the ground that it would be inconsistent
to allow the jury to know the total amount of damages while
prohibiting counsel from suggesting by means of a "per
diem" evaluation how he arrived at the total.
We do not find the reasoning of Botta convincing. It is, of
course, axiomatic that pain and su.1!ering are difficult to
measure in monetary terms. Yet the inescapable fact is that
this is precisely what the jury is called upon to do. As one
critic of Botta has noted: "The plaintiff sues for money. The
defendant defends against an award of money. The jury is
limited to expressing its findings in terms of money. Nevertheless, the -jury must be precluded from hearing any reference
whatever to money. It must retire to the jury room in vacuo
on this essential of the case where the unmentionable· and
magical conversion from broken bones to hard cash may then
take place." (Note (1958) supra, 12 Rutgers L.Rev. 522.)
[7] It is undeniable that the argument of counsel does not
constitute evidence. However, it does not follow, as averred in
Botta, that the suggestion of a sum for damages can have no
foundation in the evidence. Indeed it is necessarily inferred
from observation of the plaintiff in the courtroom and from
expert testimony regarding the nature of his injuries and their
consequences. If the jury must infer from what it sees and
hears at the trial that a certain amount of money is warranted
as compensation for the plaintiff's pain and suffering, there is
no justification for prohibiting counsel from making a similar
deduction in argument. [8] An attorney is permitted to
discuss all reasonable inferences from the evidence. (4-County
Electric Power Assn. v. Clardy (1954) 221 Miss. 403 [73 So.2d
144, 151-152, 44 A.IJ.R.2d 1191] ; J. D. Wright &- Son Truck
Line v. Chandler (Tex.Oiv.App. 1950) 231 S.W.2d 786, 789.)
It would be paradoxical to hold that damages in totality are
inferable from the evidence but that when this sum is divided
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into segments representing days, months or years, the inference vanishes.
[9] Thus, an attorney who suggests that his client's
damages for pain and suffering be calculated on a "per
diem" basis is not presenting evidence to the jury but is
merely drawing an inference from the evidence given at the
trial. [10] Of course, the trial court has the power and
duty to contain argument within legitimate bounds and it may
prevent the attorney from drawing inferences not warranted
by the evidence. For example, counsel should not be permitted
to argue future damages for pain and suffering on a "per
diem" basis where the evidence would not justify an inference that the plaintiff will suffer pain in the future.
Another dubious aspect of Botta is its conclusion that an
attorney who employs the "per diem" argument invades the
province of the jury. It seems patently clear that an attorney
does not interfere with a jury's tlecision-making powers to
any greater extent when he suggests that damages be measured
on a segmented basis than when he exhorts the jury to find the
defendant negligent. It has never been contended that the jury
forsakes its duty of determining whether the defendant acted
as a reasonable man because counsel is permitted to discuss the
participants' conduct and the inferences to be drawn
therefrom. [11] Nor should we conclude as a matter of law
that a jury will ignore the court's instructions to award a
reasonable amount as compensation for the plaintUf's pain
and suffering and that it will inevitably choose an indefensible
course of slavishly following counSel's suggestions on damages, merely because he asserts in argument that such compensation"should be measured on a "per diem" basis. [12] The
jury is, in any event, the ultimate judge of the inferences to
be drawn from the evidence presented and it is so instructed
by the court.
Many of the authorities, including Botta, point out that it is
logically inconsistent to permit counsel to inform the jury of
the lump sum amount claimed by the plaintUf or to suggest
that a certain sum be awarded, while shielding the jury from
the suggestion that the total amount may be fragmented to
represent periods of time. These cases reason that discussion of
a "per diem" amount involves no more speculation than a
total figure. (See, e.g., Yates v. Wenk (1961) supra, 109
N.W.2d 828, 831; Louisville &- Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mattingly
(1960) supra, 339 S.W.2d 155, 161; but see Caley v. Manicke
(1962) supra, 182 N.E.2d 206, 209; Duguay v. Gelinas (1962)
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supra, 182 A.2d 451; Affett v. M'uwaukee d7 Suburban Tratnsport Corp. (1960) supra, 106 N.W.2d 274, 280; cf. Franco v.
Fujimoto (1964) supra, 390 P.2d 740, 748-750.)1 Indeed, in a
Nevada case the court stated that, while it found the reasoning
of Botta very persuasive, it felt compelled to allow "per
diem" argument because of the practice in Nevada of telling
the jury the total amount of damages sought by the plaintiff.
(Johnson v. Brown (1959) supra, 345 P.2d 754, 759.)8
Moreover, the jury itself may·calculate the segmented amount
of a verdict which it has under discussion from the :figures
available since, in addition to the lump sum amount sought, it
is customarily told the life expectancy of the plaintiff where it
is claimed there will be future detriment.
.
Some legal scholars indicate the actual subjective basis for
decisions which hold the "per diem" argument improper is
the belief such argument results in excessive verdicts (see, e.g.,
Note (1962) U.Ill.L.F. 269, 274; Note (1960) supra, 33 So.Cal.
L.Rev. 214, 219) and that courts which prohibit the "per
diem" argument demonstrate a lack of confidence in the jury
system (see Note (1961) 14 U.Fla.L.Rev. 189, 191; Note
(1962) supra, 60 Mich.L.Rev. 612, 625). [13] Even if it can
be established that larger verdicts result on occasions when the
, 'per diem" argument is employed, it does not necessarily
follow that these awards are excessive under the circumstances
of the particular cases since, as pointed out hereinafter, both
the trial and the appellate courts have the power and the duty
to reduce verdicts which are unreasonably large. As was stated
in one case, "if the evil feared is excessive verdicts, then the
cure ought to be directed against the product, not the
practice." (Johnson v. Colglazier (1965) 348 F.2d 420, 425,
429 (dissenting opinion; the majority opinion in J ohnsan was
overruled in Baron Tube Co. v. Transport Ins. Co. (5th eire
1966) sup"a, 365 F.2d 858).)
Some of the cases which cite the danger of excessive
damages as a basis for disapproving the "per diem" argument (e.g., Fat/,ght v. Washam (1959) supra, 329 S.W.2d 588,
TIn the Franco case it was held there was no incompatibility between
allowing tIle court to instruct the jury as to the total amount claimed
by the plaintiff, while refusing to permit the" per diem" argument, because the purpose of the former ,vas to advise the jury of the limit on
the amount of its verdict. The court expressly refrained from deeiding
whether it was proper for counsel to argue for a specific lump sum award.
(390 P.2d at p. 249, fn. 2.)
8As set forth above, Nevada is one of the states which leaves the
question of the propriety of "per diem" argument to the discretion of
the trial court.
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604) point to a Florida case (Braddock v. Seaboard Airline
R.R. Co. (Fla. 1955) 80 So.2d 662, aitd. 96 So.2d 127) in
which "per diem" damages were argued and the jury
returned a verdict of $248,439, the exact amount requested by
plaintiff's counsel. In Seffert v. Los Angeles Tt'ansit Lines,
Inc. (1961) supra, 56 Cal.2d 498, the same type of argument
was made and a verdict of $187,903.75 was returned, also
coinciding with the sum proposed by the attorney. Despite
isolated instances such as the foregoing, there can be little
doubt that in the vast majority of cases the jury does not
follow counsel's suggestions as to damages, regardless of the
proposed mathematical basis (e.g., Boutang v. Twin City
Motor Bus Co. (1956) 248 Minn. 240 [80 N.W.2d 30] [counsel
argued "per diem" damages, asked for $59,405.80, verdict of
$26,500; see Note (1959) S1lpra, 43 Minn.L.Rev. 832, 834, fn.
13]), and conversely there are examples of substantial verdicts
in cases in which there is no indication that counsel suggested
any figure whatever to the jury as damages. [14] But even
where the amount awarded is identical to the sum suggested,
the verdict is not excessive as a matter of law. The circumstances may indicate the prescience of the attorney or his
accurate evaluation of the case. (E.g., see Braddock v. Sea.board Airline R.R. Co. (1955) supra, in which the Supreme
Court of Florida sustained the award in spite of the defendant's contention that it was unreasonably large.)
Other objections made to the use of a mathematical formula
are that it produces an illusion of certainty which appeals to
the jury but can only mislead it (Caley v. Manicke (1962)
supra, 182 N.E.2d 206, 208) and that it can result in grossly
magnifying the total damages by shrewd manipulation of, the
unit of time employed. In AfJett v. Milwaukee & Suburban
Transport Corp. (1960) supra, 106 N.W.2d 274, 280, it is said
that the absurdity of using a mathematical formula is demonstrated by the fact that an attorney could, instead of using a
day as the unit of time for measurement, ask the jury to
calculate his client's pain and suffering in terms of seconds.
Thus, one cent for each second of pain may not seem
unreasonable, but if the damages were to be calculated on this
basis it would result in $86.40 for a 24-hour day, $31,536 for
each year, and an absurdly high figure in toto.
There are at least two answers to the foregoing objections.
[15] First, whatever manner of calculation is proposed by
counselor employed by the jury, the verdict must meet the
test of reasonableness. The "per diem" argument is only a
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suggestion as to one method of reaching the goal of reasonableness, not a substitute for it. [16] If the jury's award
does not meet this test, the trial court has the duty to reduce
it, and the appellate court has the authority to review the
result.9 To be sure, the standard of reasonableness permits the
jury a wide latitude of discretion, but there is no convincing
assurance that the accuracy of its evaluation would be
enhanced by prohibiting counsel from suggesting that the
plaintiff's compensation for pain and suffering be measured ill
aggregates of short periods of time rather than by a total sum
award for a longer period.
[11] Second, there exist meaningful safeguards to prevent
the jury from being misled. As expected of him by his client,
plaintiff's attorney will urge the jury to award the maximum
amount of damages which the evidence plausibly justifies, but
he has the best of reasons for refraining from grossly exaggerating hiscbiim since, by doing so, he may so tax the credulity
of the jury that it will disregard his entire argument. Counsel
assumes "the risk of overpersuasion" (Brown, J., in HaU v.
Burkert (1962) 117 Ohio App. 527 [193 N.E.2d 167, 169]). If
he overstates his claim by the device dsecribed in AjJeH, there
is nothing to prevent defense counsel from pointing out this
stratagem or to argue that the amount suggested is excessive
and emphasize that the jury's duty is to award only a reason·
able sum as compensation. to [18] More important, the trial
GIn Thill v. Modem Erecti'lt.g 00. (1965) 272 Minn. 217 [136 N.W.2d
677], the trial court reduced a jury verdict of $642,400 to $375,000, and
this was upheld on appeal. While the court agreed" with the trial court
that the jury reached an excessive verdict by logical application of
mathematical formulas that swelled the total sum beyond a reasonable
figure, " it found no fault with the process. only that the basic figures
used in computation "did not take into account considerations that
tend to decrease an award."
In California it has been said, "The trial judge sits as a thirteenth
juror with the power to weigh the evidence and judge the credibility of
the witnesses. If he believes the damages awarded by the jury to be
excessive and the question is presented it becomes his duty to reduce
them." (Seffert v. Los AngeZes Transit Lines (1961) supra, 56 Cal.2d
at p. 507.) The appellate court's power in this regard is more limited,
but a verdict may be reduced on appeal where it is so large as to shock
the court's sense of justice and raise a presumption that it was the
result of prejudice. (Johnston v. Long (1947) 30 Ca1.2d 54, 57, 76
[181 P.2d 645].)
tOBotta states that defense counsel is placed in an unfair position
when the "per diem" argument is made because, while he can argue
that pain and suffering should be assessed at a lesser sum per day or per
month than that suggested by the plaintiff, this can only fortify the
implication that the law recognizes the "per diem" method of evalu.
ation ns valid. The defect in this approach to the problem is that it
assumes the impropriety of the "per diem" argument.

)
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Court can and should instruct the jury that the argument of
counsel as to the amount of damages claimed by the plaintiff is
llot evidence and that its duty is only to award such damages
as will reasonably compensate the plaintiff for his pain and
suffering. (See BAJI Nos. 174-L and 174-M.) [19] The
court may also, if it deems appropriate, advise the jury it is
not bound by any particular method of calculation in assessing
damages for pain and suffering.
Every case which has considered the issue before us has
emphasized the difficulty faced by a jury in attempting to
measure in monetary terms compensation for injuries as
$ubjective as pain, humiliation and embarrassment. The cases
abound in broad statements such as that the matter is
entrusted to the" impartial conscience and judgment of jurors
who may be expected to act reasonably, intelligently and in
harmony with the evidence," and that they are to award
"fair and reasonable compensation" and be guided by "their
observation, experience .and sense of fairness and right."
(See, e.g, Botta v. Brunner (1958) supra, 138 A.2d at pp. 718720.) These homilies provide little assistance to the jury.
Under some circumstances, the concept of pain and suffering
may become more meaningful when it is measured in short
periods of time than over a span of many years, perhaps into
infinity. The "worth" of pain over a period of decades is
often more difficult to grasp as a concept of reality than is the
same experience limited to a day, a week or a month. It is this
very consideration which underlies much of the controversy
over the issue before us. [20] The fact that the "per
diem" argument provides a more explicit comprehension and
humanization of the plaintiff's predicament to lay jurors
makes this approach an effective tool in the hands of his
attorney. This alone is not, however, a sufficient reason to
condemn it.
[21] We pause to note that the "per diem" device is not
beneficial exclusively to plaintiffs seeking damages. It is a
double-edged sword with equal availability and utility in
nrgument by defendant's counsel who may employ the technique of dividing plaintiff '8 total demand into time segments
in order to illustrate how exaggerated or ludicrous the claim
maybe.
[22] Denial of the" per diem" argument deprives counsel
of the full fruits of effective advocacy on the issue of damages,
which is not infrequently the crucial conflict in the trial of an
action for personal injuries. [23] Only the most persuasive
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reasons justify handcuffing attorneys in the exercise of their
advocacy within the bQunds of propriety. [24] [See fn.
11.] We do not find them here. l l
Defendant and amici curiae urge that even if we do not
adhere to the Botta prohibitory rule, we should hold that the
"per diem' ~ argument is not available as a matter of right
but, rather, the entire question should be subject to the discretion of the trial court. We believe this would be an undesirable
solution, creating more problems than it would solve. The
inevitable results would be peremptory challenges to judges on
the basis of whether or not they were inclined to permit argument on a mathematical basis, and the proliferation of appeals
on the complex question of whether the court's discretion was
abused in a particular case. [25] Existing rules relating to
the trial court's control ,over the scope of counsel's argument
are sufficient to protect the integrity of the jury's decisionmaking role. There is no justification for holding that the
"per diem" argument is governed by special standards not
applicable to other types of argument.
[26] We come, finally, to the question whether the trial
court's error in limiting counsel's argument in the present
case resulted in prejudice. (Cal. Const., art. VI, §4%.) Plaintiff, a carpenter by trade, was 39 years old at the time of the
accident.' He was hospitalized for 12 days. He suffered cuts on
his head and hands, a sliver of wood became lodged under his
eyelid, and one of his front teeth was chipped in the mishap.
Subsequently, his vision became impaired. He had not worn
eyeglasses prior to the accident but was required to obtain ,&
pair shortly thereafter, and a few weeks after receiving the
first pair of glasses he suffered another change in his vision,
requiring a different prescription for his eyeglasses.
Plaintiff did not have any pains in his back before the accident, but subsequent tllereto he had severe back pains which
radiated down his thighs to the knees. He was required to
wear a back brace and had been unable to work in his trade as
a carpenter since the accident. A medical doctor testified that
plaintiff was suffering from a congenital back defect known as
spondylolisthesis and, although there is some conflict in the
evidence on the issue, the expert testimony strongly indicates
11 In holding that counsel may properly suggest to the jury that
plaintiff's pain and suffering be measured on a "per diem" basis, we
do not imply that we also approve the so-called "golden rule" argument,
hy which counsel asks the jurors to place themselves in the plaintiff's
shoes and to award such damages as they would "charge" to undergo
equivalent pain and suffering.
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that this condition became symptomatic as a result of the accident. The doctor also testified that an operation costing $2,000
would be necessary in order to relieve plaintiff's condition.
After an examination of the entire record, we are compelled to
conclude that it is reasonably probable that a result more
favorable to plaintiff would have been reached if the trial
court had not limited counsel's argument on the question of
damages for pain and suffering. (See People v. Watson (1956)
46 Ca1.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243].)
When prejudicial error appears in the determination of the
issue of damages, "It has been held that on an appeal from a
judgment where the evidence as to liability is 'overwhelming'
a retrial may be limited to the issue of damages. [Citations.]
[27] Where, however, the evidence as to liability is in sharp
and substantial conflict, and the damages awarded are so
grossly inadequate as to indicate a compromise on the issues of
liability and damages, the case should be remanded for a
retrial of both issues." (Clifford v. Ruocco (1952) 39 Ca1.2d
327, 329 [246 P.2d 651] ; see also Leipert v. Honold (1952) 39
Ca1.2d 462, 467 [247 P.2d 324, 29 A.L.R.2d 1185] ; Rose v.
Melody Lane (1952) 39 Ca1.2d 481, 488-489 [247 P.2d 335] ;
Oary v. Wentzel (1952) 39 Cal.2d 491, 492-493 [247 P.2d
341] ; Hanwsaki v. Flotho (1952) 39 Cal.2d 602, 604-607 [248
P.2d 910].)
The judgment is reversed.
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J'J Peek, J'J and Burke, J.,
concurred.
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TRAYNOR, C. J.-I concur in the judgment.
In my opinion the trial court committed prejudicial error in
refusing to allow plaintiff's attorney to state to the jury his
monetary estimate of an appropriate award for pain and
suffering. Since the jury must convert pain and suffering into
dollars and cents, counsel should be permitted to advance any
reasonable argument as to wilat its decision should be. Since
there is no mathematical formula for such conversion, however, an argument that the jury should use such a formula is
suspect, and an argument that damages for pain and suffering
should be computed at so much per unit of time is so mi~lead
ing that it should never be allowed. (See Seffert v. Los
Angeles Transit Lines, 56 Ca1.2d 498, 509, 513-514 [15 Cal.
Rptr. 161, 364 P.2d 337], dissenting opinion.) It is one thing
to urge that in view of all of the evidence of pain and suffer-
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ing including its total duration, some specific sum or range of
sums is reasonable. It is quite another to urge the jury to use a
formula such as a mill or penny per second, or penny or nickel
or dime per minute, or $10 or $20 or $100 per day. None of
these formulas appears unreasonable on its face, for there is no
basis in human experience for testing their reasonableness. For
a year of pain and suffering~ however, they yield damages
ranging from $3,650 to $315,360, sums that in the light of all
of the evidence in particular cases might appear to be grossly
inadequate or grossly excessive. It is therefore unrealistic to
seek an appropriate award for pain and suifering by the use of
any so-called per diem formula. Only after counsel has deter..
mined how much damages for pain and suifering he is going to
ask for can he select a per diem ratio to support his .request.
He could arriye at any amount he wished by adjusting either
the period of time to be taken as a measure or the amount
surmised. for the pain and suifering for that period. It is no
answer that the question-begging in his reasoning may be
exposed by counterargument or challenged by an equally
fictive formula leading to a different result. Truth is not
served by sophistic arguments or clashes between them. (See
Sefferf v. L08 Angeles TrO/nBilt Line8, 56 Ca1.2d 498, 509, 514
[15 Ca1.Rp.tr. 161, 364 P.2d 337], dissenting opinion.)
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